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I -INTRODUCTION
The Brady plan has triggered a number of proposals aimed at reducing the face value of LDC debt. As now well understood in the literature on this topic, there is a gap which may be very large between the debt relief which is nominally granted to (or purchased by) a debtor and the relief which is actually given up by the creditors (when measured in terms of the net transfers which the debtor is expected to pay).
As indeed pointed out by Dooley (1988) , a country that announces or that is expected to repurchase a significant of Its debt on the secondary market immediately raises the price at which the transaction must be undertaken (at a level that corresponds to its ex-post value).
One direct consequence of this observation is that It is certainly counter-productive to set up an institution or to create a facility that openly repurcnases a given quantity of LDC debt on the secondary market.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Bulow and Rogoff (198P) , even if the country repurchases a small amount (or "ride-up" the supply curve by repurchasing its debt one dollar after the other), the price at which the transaction is performed on the secondary market corresponds to the average value of the debt which is (perhaps well) above the mar&inal price that properly measures the actual reduction of the burden of the debt that is obtained by the debtor.
In this paper, I attempt to give some empirical flesh to these crucial (qualitative) remarks by giving an exact valuation formula for LDC debt which mimicks, it is hoped, the pricing that is obseorved on the secondary market. Using some reasonable numbers, I will show that, following Doley's point, a country that announces in advance that it will seek to repurchase half of the face value of its debt may end-up over-paying the market value of debt by about 45 %. Following Bulow and
Rogoff's argument, I then show that a country (that is solvent in "average") may over-pay the buy-back of Its debt by a ratio of one to two. I also offer to estimate other transactions such as the value of guaranteeing against exogeneous stock the payments that are I made by the country: I will show that such a guarantee Is not likely to exceed 25 7 of the market value of the debt.
Section II offers a motivation and a theoretical background for this paper. Section III gives the valuation formula and gives the discount associated to various parameters of the country. Section IV shows the difference between average and marginal prices and estimate the value for the country of making a "take it or leave it" offer to Its creditors ; section V gives an estimate of the cost of guaranteeing the debt. A conclusion gives some perspectives on the Mexican deal that has been negotiated in July 1989.
-MOTIVATION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The literature on sovereign risk can be compactly summarized as in the following model. Take a two-period model and assume that a country has to repay In period 2 a debt whose contractual value is D.
Furthermore, assume that the country always has the option to repudiate its debt and also assume that the banks can (credibly) impose -in retallation-a sanction that amounts to a fraction AQ of the country's income. Q. Finally, assume that the banks can always get the country to pay 'hat fraction AQ that the country would forego by defaulting. Call dF; the density of the (random) distribution of the country's income.
Let r be the riskless rate and take the banks to be risk-neutral. One can write the market value of the debt D as
The first term in the bracket represents how much the banks can get when the income of the country satisfies AQ s D. In that case indeed the country would rather default than paying the face value of the debt and we assumed that the banks can get the country to pay the fraction AQ that the country would lose by doing so.
2
The second term in the bracket measures the expected payments that accrue to the banks when the country does honor the contractual value of the debt. This happens with a probability 1-F(D/A).
There are obviously many questions that such a model does not address. Why Is it that the debt Is not a contract that is contingent on the realization of Q ? Where does the debt comes from and why Is it that there Is not a clause that raises the face value D when -in expected terms-the country is insolvent ? What would happen if bargaining considerations were introduced in the second period ? How to handle the incentive questions when Q is endogeneously determined by capital accumulation ? These questions are not all specific to the debt literature (in particular the uncontingent dimension of the debt). Some are, such as the bargaining questions. We can only, here, refer to earlier works such as the surveys In Eaton, Gersovltz and Stiglltz (1986) . or the papers contained In Dealing With T Debt Crisis (1990) or to our own work (Cohen, 1991) for an attempt to answer some of these questions.
The issue that we want to address here Is one that has been raised by Bulow and Rogoff (1988) and Dooley (1988) in a similar set up and is related to the valuation of the debt and Its Implication for debt buy-backs. Consider equation (1). The market price of the debt (such as observed on the secondary market) can simply be written as
If a country were to repurchase one dollar of its debt on the secondary market, this is the price that it would have to pay. Now Dooley (1988) has made the following remark. Assume that the country is known in advance to want to repurchase a share B of Its debt.
At which price will the transaction take place ? If lenders act competitiveiy and if they are all aware of the transaction B that the country wants to undertake, they will oniy accept to sell at the price that will prevail ex-Dost, after the transaction is completed. This price is simply
and is obviously larger (perhaps much larger) than the initial price.
This argument Is aimLd at showing that it is not a good business to buy-back a large amount of debt and letting the creditors know it.
The second key remark is the one made by Bulow and Rogof. (1988) .
Even when it only performs a small transaction, the country has to pay a price such as (2) that does not properly measure the benefit accruing to it when it repurchases its debt. Indeed, one dollar repurchased by the country reduces the burden of the repayment by an amount which is measured by the marfzinal (rather than the average) price of the debt.
Here, this marginal price is:
which Is strictly (perhaps much) lower than q(D).
So, even if the country could "ride-up" the price-quantity schedule and repurchase, one dollar after the other, the quantity B, it would end up paying the reduction of the market value of the debt by an amount D f q(D) dD which is above the actual reduction of the debt's market
All these questions are obviously extremely important in assessing the key question of determining which strategy the country should undertake in order to alleviate -through the secondary market-the burden of its debt.
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The model above, however, is very qualitative and does not help very much assessing the empirical magnitude of the effects that It points out to. It is the purpose of the following sections to address this empirical dimension.
III -A VALUATION FORMULA FOR LDC DEBT
We want to generalize a formula such (1) so as to give It an dmpirical content. In order to do that, we shall make the foll. wing assumptions. We consider a continuous time model of an infinitely lived economy. We assume that the resources Qt Of the country follow a
Brownian process and we let Pt X A Qt represent how much the banks can.
at most, oblige the country to pay. We write the law of motion of Pt as
We also assume that the debt is short-term and continuously rescheduled at the riskless rate of Interest by the creditors. With that hypothesis, the banks can always capture P I(=A Qt) as long as the debt is not entirely repaid.
The hypothesis that the debt is short-term Is somehow farfetched, but not too much. When they reschedule the debt of an Insolvent country, the banks like to keep a short-leash approach so as to make sure that they do not lose an opportunity to monitor the country's choices.
The assumption that the debt is rescheduled at the riskless rate may appear more debatable. Analyzing a fixed spread over libor would not be very Interesting ,however, since the spread should decline as the country becomes solvent. Our assumption is instead litterally true for the public debt that is negotiated at the Paris Club. For commercial banks,the spread over llbor is actually quite small and has been steadily declining. In Call qt the market price of the debt so that Vt = qt Dt and call P t x D the apparent yield on the country's debt. We shall seek a Dt function q(x) which is a solution to (3). Making use of Ito's lemma, one can show that q(x) is a solution to the following differential equation: (4) 2 q'(x) x2 oc2 4 x q'(x) [gs-rexl -q(x) x x e O There are two boundary conditions. When x approaches 0 (the face value of the debt becomes infinite), then the banks simply get the present discounted value of all Pt. Therefore lim q(x) 1 t'
~x->O x
The other boundary condition is the following. When x = X (the face value of the debt goes to zero) the country is solvent, so that I im q(x) = 1 (the debt is quoted at par).
X->se
One can then check (see appendix for details) that the price q(x) of the debt can then be written: 
0~~~~~~~~~~~
On Diagram 1 the so'id live qo(x) represents the market price of the debt when there Is no risk (a=O). It Is w rth qo(x) -f when x < xo xo and 1 otherwise. In the zero-risk case, the country's debt is quoted below par whenever the present discounted value of the transfers paid by the debtor Is below the face value of the debt. When the present discounted value of these transfers exceeds the face value of the debt. then there will necessarily come a point when the country will have repaid all its debt, so that the price Is necessarily one all the time.
When the transfers are risky (r > 0), the expected present discounted value of all Pt Is again r and It does not depend on -. The difference between the risky and the non risky case is due to the fact that a gMd fortune may help the country repay all Its debt sn that the value of the claim held by the debtor is 1M than the present discounted value of lal future transers Pt. (A similar picture emerges in Genotte, Kharas and Sadeq 1987).
In the case when x = xo, for instance, present discounted value calculation (based on the assumption that creditors would receive Pt for ever) would lead to the misleading Implication that the debt should be quoted at par. In table 1, we have shown the discount which Instead appears when the risk component is taken Into account, In that case x 0 (when x = x ) and in the case when x = 2 B -2 " so that a standard deviation a-0.2 (which Is that which Is observed on Wall Street) and a difference between interest rate and growth of 4 percentage points lead to 3 = 2 which we shall take as our benchmark case in the sequel.
As a simple application of table 1, one may ask: what is the equivalence, from the creditors' view point, between an increase in the growth rate of payments and a reduction of current payments?
When the value of the debt is infinite, the equivalence is straightforward to calculate. The value of the debt Is simply V = -O so that Fd -. If growth is increased by I percentage point then, say when r-,u a 4 %, lenders can accept a 25 7 reduction of the transfers made by the country. This 25 7. reduction is obviously the maximum amount of debt service reduction that lenders can accept when the debt Is finite. When the debt is very small, for example, the trade-off becomes a negligible one as the lenders care less about the future growth of the country's ability to pay in the future (since they do not expect to cash it in full).
As an intermediate case, it is possible to use formula (1) to see how this trade-off operates when x xo, 3 = 2 and r-. = 0.04. One can calculate In that case that an additionnal I percentage point of the country's growth can "buy" a 15 % reduction of the current payments that the country makes to its creditors.
IV -THE VALUE OF A DEBT WRITE-OFF
we see from table 1 that the debt must be repurchased at 73 cents on the dollar, despite an initial price of 45 cents on the dollar before the transaction was announced. This indicates that repurchasing half the £ae viuen oL gh debt costs 62 Z. of its initial market value.
2 -Assume now instead that banks can rationnally coordinate their collective behavior and that the country can make the banks a credible "take it or leave it" offer such as: "repurchase the debt at such price or I use the money in an alternative way which yields no benefits to you (say I consume it)". What is now the cost -under this hypothesis-of xo repurchasing half the debt. When x goes from T-to x 0 , the value of the banks' claims is reduced by a number which is
This implies that the banks must be compensated for reducing the debt by half by a fraction e of their initial claim which is equal to 0 a AV . r l _ I q(x)l q(x/2).D 2 q(x/2) 7
When 13 = 2. we find that e 18 %. This number can therefore be advantageously compared to the 62 % which was found In the previous paragraph. Under the hypotheses which have adopted, ihe caDabilicy of maklne j credible offer to the banks therefore reDresents as much as 44%
gE She market value of the debt. This shows that the point made by Dooley can indeed be potentially very important.
3 -As pointed out by Bulow and Rogoff (1988) , we have seen that, when small transactions are involved, the relevant statistic to analyze the value of a debt reduction is the marginal value of the debt. Call p * d this marginal price. p measures the market value which the banks as a whole are actually giving up when they reduce the face value of the debt by one dollar. Mathematically one finds p = q(x) -xq'(x). As x approaches zero (the debt becomes very large), it is easy to check that the ratio of the marginal to the average price of the debt is zero (the lenders -as a whole-do not care at all about one more or one less dollar). Conversely, as the debt goes to zero, the marginal and the 11 average prices do converge one towards the other. In -10) and twice bigger a debt, the marginal price is virtually zero, while the discount which Is observed on the secondary market is about 50%.
These results confirm the econometric evidences which are shown In Cohen (1989) where it was indeed found -out of a direct analysis of the data on the secondary market-that the hypothesis that the marginal price was zero could not be statistically rejected when the debt was quoted at a 50 % discount.
(The evidence brought by Bulow and Rogoff (1988) for the Bolivian debt also strongly pointed to the fact that Its marginal price was zero). Offering a guarantee on the payment of the debt usually Involves two distinct mechanisms. One is to guarantee that, say the interest will always be paid. The other one amounts to protect the lenders from the stochastic disturbances which afflict the ability of the country to service its debt. The first mechanism is generally = a pure guarantee and may actually enhance the average ability of the country to service its debt. To that extent, it involves a partial bail out of the banks as well as a pure Insurance mechanism. In this section we limit our analysis to the second mechanism and ask: what is the value of protecting the banks against the fluctuations of the countries' ability to pay. Mathematically, this simply amounts to substitute to the stochastic streams of repayment Pt a deterministic pattern Pt = P U which has the same expected mean, and offer the banks Min [ Do. rWhen the face value of the debt is infinite, the market value of such an insurance scheme is simply zero. Indeed, the bank are assumed to be risk-neutral and they already expect -in present value terms-to receive r When the debt is not inflnite, the value of the guarantee is simply given by the difference between the market price of the debt and the qo(x) line displayed in diagram 1. From this diagram, it Is apparent that the maximum value of such a guarantee is obtained at the point when x = x 0 . At this point the country would be solvent If the banks could make sure to get P 0 e pt rather than Pt. One also sees that the maximum value of the guarantee is nothing else but the market discount which the debt would exhibit at this point. We therefore see, for instanee, that the value (to the banks) of 1) 42 7. of the debt is swapped against a bond whose face value is written down by 35 % ; 2) 46 Z of the debt Is swapped against a bond with a reduced nominal interest rate ; 3) 12 7 of the debt will be rescheduled along the line of the third option. One may estimate that a nominal write-off of about 15 bls emerged from the deal (see Claessens and Van Winjbergen, 1990) . The market value of this nominal 14 write-off must be estimated at the marginal price shown in table 2.
For ,1 = 2. we get the following: In exchange, 4 bls of new money (2 from the World Bank and the IMF.
2 from the Japanese Government) were put on the table to "encourage" the deal. Let us interpret those 4 bls as a loan which is understood by the parties to be junior to the newly issued bonds. The value to the senior creditors of a funior claim is simply measured by its face value minus Its marginal price (which corresponds to the case when the junior money is indeed cashed in back by the junior creditors). It is reported in 
